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A LAW PROFESSOR'S GUIDE TO NATURAL 
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
RANDYE. BARNETT* 
Law professors nowadays mention natural law and natural 
rights on a regular basis, and not just in jurisprudence. Given 
that the founding generation universally subscribed to the idea 
of natural rights, this concept regularly makes a prominent 
appearance in discussions of constitutional law. One simply 
cannot avoid the concept if one is to explain Justice Samuel 
Chase's well-known claim in Calder v. Bull that "[t]here are 
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, 
which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant 
abuse of legislative power .... An ACf of the Legislature (for I 
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the 
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of 
legislative authority."2 Nor can law professors explain to their 
students the reference in the Ninth Amendment to the "other" 
rights "retained by the people"3 without mentioning "the pre-
existent rights of nature. "4 
Yet in my experience, when law professors discuss natural 
rights, they typically run this concept together with that of 
natural law. Though these two ideas are closely related, they are 
not the same. This Symposium is intended to discuss the 
difference between natural law and natural rights. Whereas the 
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. This paper was 
prepared for presentation at the 1997 meeting of the Jurisprudence Section of the 
Association of American Law Schools and is based on a portion of the introduction to my 
book, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTI: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming 1998) 
[hereinafter BARNETI, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTI]. I wish to thank David Lyons, Tom 
Palmer, Henry Veatch, Michael Zuckert, and Stephen Shute for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft. Permission to photocopy for classroom use is hereby granted. © 1997 
by Randy E. Barnett. 
1. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
2. Id. at388 (emphasis removed). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
4. 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES [ANNALS 
OF CONGRESS] 437 Uoseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James Madison). 
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other contributors are taking primarily an historical and 
descriptive approach, my approach will be more conceptual and 
normative. That is, I will explain how I think the, concept of 
natural law ought to be distinguished from that of natural rights. 
Nonetheless, I believe (though I will not take pains to 
demonstrate) that the distinction I draw between the two 
concepts is consistent with much of the classical usage of these 
terms and helps clarify such usage. 
I. THE NATURAL LAW METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
The idea of natural law is mysterious to us today." We are 
accustomed to thinking of law as the command of the 
legislature, or perhaps the command of a government official or 
judge, that is enforced by a government. A natural law, whatever 
that might be, that was not incorporated into a command 
enforceable by government seems hardly worth the paper it isn't 
written on. How can there be a law in any meaningful sense in 
the absence of government recognition and enforcement? 
But when we think of the disciplines of engineering or 
architecture, the idea of a natural law is not so mysterious. For 
example, engineers reason that, given the force that gravity 
exerts on a building, ifwe want a building that will enable 
persons to live or work inside it, then we need to provide a 
foundation, walls, and roof of a certain strength. The physical 
law of gravity leads to the following "natural law" injunction for 
human action: given that gravity will cause us to fall rapidly, if we 
want to live and be happy, then we had better not jump off tall 
buildings. The principles of engineering, though formulated by 
human beings, are not a product of their will. These principles 
must come to grips with the nature of human beings and the 
world in which human beings live, and they operate whether or 
not they are recognized or enforced by any government. And 
though they are never perfectly precise and always subject to 
incremental improvements and sometimes even breakthroughs, 
they are far from arbitrary, and we violate them at our peril. 
5. This reaction is less true today, however, than at any time in the past several 
decades. See, e.g., NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY EssAYS (Robert P. George ed., 
1992); Natural Law Symposium: Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 
(1990); Symposium: Perspectives on Naturall..aw, 61 U. CJN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium on 
Naturall..mu, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. LJ. 455 (1995). 
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The disciplines of engineering and architecture are normative 
in that, unlike the physical sciences on which they may be based 
in part, they instruct us on how we ought to act, given the nature 
of human beings and the world in which they live, and the 
purpose at hand. Nor need one be an engineer or an architect 
to formulate similar "natural law" normative principles. For 
example, the existence of gravity and the nature of the human 
body lead to the following natural law injunction for human 
action: given that gravity will cause us to fall rapidly and that our 
bodies will not withstand the fall, if we want to live and be happy, 
then we had better not jump off tall buildings. 
Could it be that the "great first principles of the social 
compact" are natural "laws" of this type? Ifwe want persons to be 
able to pursue happiness while living in society with each other, 
then they had best adopt and respect a social structure that 
reflects these principles. In the words of the influential 
seventeenth-century natural-law theorist Hugo Grotius, the 
"maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly 
sketched, and which is consonant with human intelligence, is 
the source of law."6 According to this way of thinking, "[t]he 
basic requirements of an organized social life are the basic 
principles of the naturallaw."7 
True, any such natural law principles may be more difficult to 
discern and consequently more controversial than the principles 
of engineering or architecture. Partly this is true because human 
beings are so amazingly complex and, unlike the materials from 
which buildings are constructed, are self-directed in pursuit of 
their own purposes. But the mere existence of controversy does 
not render such principles nonexistent. Nor does the fact that 
we cannot see, hear, taste, or touch them. After all, we cannot 
see, hear, taste, or touch the principles of engineering or 
architecture either. Both sets of principles or "laws" are humanly 
6. HUGO GROTIUS, 2 DE jURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 12 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Clarendon Press 1925) (1690) (citation omitted). The passage continues: 
To this sphere of law belong the abstaining from that which is another's, the 
restoration to another of anything of his which we may have, together with any 
gain which we may have received from it; the obligation to fulfil promises, the 
making good of a loss incurred through our fault, and the inflicting of penalties 
upon men according to their deserts. 
/d. at 12-13 (citation omitted). 
7. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURALLAWA.'IDTHETHEORYOFPROPER1Y 19 (1991). 
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constructed concepts used to explain and predict the world in 
which we live. 
Americans at the founding of the United States well-accepted 
the idea that the world, including worldly governments, is 
governed by laws or principles that dictate how society ought to 
be structured, in the very same way that such natural laws dictate 
how buildings ought to be built or how crops ought to be 
planted.8 Consider this passage from a sermon delivered by 
Pastor Elizur Goodrich ( 1734-1797) to the governor and general 
assembly of Connecticut on the eve of the Constitutional 
Convention: 
The principles of society are the laws, which Almighty God 
has established in the moral world, and made necessary to be 
observed by mankind; in order to promote their true 
happiness, in their transactions and intercourse. These laws 
may be considered as principles, in respect of their fixedness 
and operation; and as maxims, since by the knowledge of 
them, we discover those rules of conduct, which direct 
mankind to the highest perfection, and supreme happiness 
of their nature. They are as fixed and unchangeable as the laws 
which operate in the natural wvrld. 
Human art in vrder to produce certain effects, must conform to 
the principles and laws, which the Almighty Creator has 
established in the natural world. He who neglects the 
cultivation of his field, and the proper time of sowing, may 
not expect a harvest. He, who would assist mankind in raising 
weights, and overcoming obstacles, depends on certain rules, 
derived from the knowledge of mechanical principles applied 
to the construction of machines, in order to give the most 
useful effect to the smallest force: And every builder should 
well understand the best position of firmness and strength, 
when he is about to erect an edifice. For he, who attempts these 
things, on other principles, than those of nature, attempts to make a 
new wvrld; and his aim will prove absurd and his labour lost. No 
more can mankind be conducted to happiness; or civil 
societies united, and enjoy peace and prosperity, without 
observing the moral principles and connections, which the 
8. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 
YALE LJ. 907 (1993). Although Hamburger presents a remarkably sensitive analysis of 
the evidence concerning the founding generation's understanding of natural law and 
natural rights with which I am in general agreement, I do not share his contention,which 
is beyond the scope of this article, that this generation did not think natural rights were a 
source oflegal claims to be made in a court. 
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same Almighty Creator has established for the government of 
the moral world. 9 
659 
Notice that, although Goodrich identifies God as the original 
source of the laws that govern in the moral world, so too does he 
identify God as the source of the laws that govern agriculture 
engineering and architecture. With both types of principles and 
laws, once established by a divine power they become part of the 
world in which we find ourselves and are discoverable by human 
reason. Thus today one can no more disparage the idea of 
natural law (or natural rights) because eighteenth-century 
thinkers attributed their origin to a divine power than one can 
disparage the laws of physics because eighteenth-century 
scientists believed that such laws were also established by God. 
Whatever the source of these moral principles or laws, 
however they came to be inscribed in the world in which we live, 
Goodrich's argument is that they must be respected if we are to 
achieve the end of happiness, peace, and prosperity. As Hugo 
Grotius wrote: ''What we have been saying [about natural law] 
would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that 
which cannot be conceded without L.;.e utmost wickedness, that 
there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to 
Him."10 Richard Tuck characterizes this passage to mean: "Given 
the natural facts about men, the laws of nature followed by 
(allegedly) strict entailment without any mediating premisses 
about God's will (though his will might still be an explanation of 
those natural facts)." 11 
When one mentions "natural law," some ask, "where are these 
natural. laws?" Are they "out there" somewhere? Yet we do not 
speak of the humanly-developed principles of engineering or 
agriculture as being "out there," though these principles must 
be respected if bridges are to stand and crops to grow. The 
9. ELIZUR GoODRICH, THE PRINCIPLES OF CML UNION AND HAPPINESS CONSIDERED 
AND RECOMMENDED: A SERMON (1787), reprinted in POLmC.AL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING ERA: 1730-1805, at 911, 914-15 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (emphasis added). 
10. 2 GROT! US, supra note 6, at 13. Of this passage Stephen Buckle writes: 
This brief remark, by affirming the possibility of at least a partially secularized 
political theory, exercised a powerful influence on subsequent political 
thought. In an age of intense political conflict arising from or reflected in 
religious differences, it also offered the prospect of peace despite continuing 
religious differences. 
BUCKLE, supra note 7, at 23. 
11. See RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
76-77 (1979). 
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"principles of society" spoken of by Goodrich are of the same 
status. They must be respected if people are to pursue 
happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in society with one 
another. 
This natural law account of moral "principles of society" 
assumes, of course, that "happiness ... peace and prosperity" 
are appropriate ends. While the essence or nature of happiness, 
peace, and prosperity may properly be controversial, should 
anyone question the assumption that these are desirable ends to 
be pursued, additional arguments will need to be presented. 
Every intellectual discipline, however, presupposes a 
commitment by those within it to certain shared ambitions or 
problems thought by all members of the discipline to be worthy 
of solution. 12 As H.L.A. Hart wrote of the human desire for 
survival: "We are committed to it as something presupposed by 
the terms of the discussion."13 Surely, the disciplines of 
agriculture, engineering, and architecture are also based on the 
assumption that human existence and happiness are worthwhile. 
The normative force of natural law can be seen therefore as 
the imperative of "if-then." If you want to achieve Y, then you 
ought to do Z If you want to live and be happy, then you ought 
not jump off tall buildings or drink poison. If you want to 
facilitate the pursuit of happiness by those living in society with 
others, then you ought to adhere to certain basic principles. 
Later in this Article, I shall return to the issue of whether it is 
appropriate to characterize as moral the normative conclusions 
reached by a "hypothetical imperative" type of natural-law 
reasoning. 
In describing natural law as based on if-then reasoning, 
however, I have omitted one crucial and problematic dimension 
of this approach. As was seen above, the existence of gravity 
provides a prefatory "given" before the if-then claim: Given that 
gravity will cause us to fall rapidly, if we want to live and be 
12. For a discussion of the nature of intellectual disciplines, see STEPHEN TOULMIN, 
HUMAN UNDERSfANDING (1972). There he explains that "the existence and unity of an 
intellectual discipline, regarded as a specific 'historical entity', reflects the continuity 
imposed on its problems by the development of its intellectual ideals and ambitions." /d. 
at 155. 
13. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 188 (1961). 
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happy, then we had better not jump off tall buildings. 14 What 
distinguishes natural law reasoning from other types of if-then 
reasoning is the particular "given" on which it is based: the 
nature of human beings and of the world in which they live. So 
the fuller argument is: "Given that the nature of human beings 
and the world in which they live is X, if we want to achieve Y, t~ 
we ought to do Z." This adds yet another layer of inquiry and 
controversy. Do human beings have a "nature"? If so, what is it, 
and how does that nature suggest that, if we want to achieve Y, 
then we ought to do Z2 
Some today may dispute the idea that human nature is 
"innate" or natural and insist that human nature is "socially 
constructed," by which is meant it is the product of complex 
interaction with others. For example, what it means to be a man 
or a woman may not be entirely biological, but rooted also in the 
expectations that are imbued in each of us by others from the 
earliest ages. While there may be much truth to this observation, 
it misunderstands the claim being made by natural-law theorists 
in two ways. First, unless one posits that this process of social 
construction can be willfully manipulated or altered, then the 
fact that human nature is a product of social processes, as 
opposed to innate natural qualities, is as immaterial to 
discerning principles of human action as the belief of classical 
thinkers that natural law was of divine origin. Even were 
processes of social construction the source of what is thought of 
as human nature, if these processes cannot freely be altered in 
any desired manner, human nature would still affect the 
manner by which we must accomplish our ends. 
Some who believe that human nature is a product of social 
construction may indeed think that it may be deliberately 
altered or manipulated. That is, they believe that if a particular 
social construction of human nature is X and we prefer it to be 
Y, we can change social processes to accomplish this objective. 
But while it seems clear that some widespread beliefs or 
prejudices can, with great effort, be changed, the types of 
human characteristics on which natural law reasoning is or 
ought to be based cannot be so affected. For example, persons 
14. There are of course many "givens" implicit in this claim. For example, given the 
fragility of the human body, it is not the fall that kills but the sudden stop at the end. 
This simply illustrates the complexity of if-then claims. 
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have access to personal and local knowledge and are pervasively 
ignorant of the personal and local knowledge of others. People 
also have a tendency to prefer their own interests and the 
interests of those for whom they have affection to the interests 
of those who are remote to them. The physical resources that 
people need to use to pursue happiness are scarce. These and 
other facts of human nature and the nature of the world in 
which we live that greatly influence the principles that order 
society, for better or worse, cannot be changed. They can only 
be dealt with.15 
Second, some who speak of social construction in this context 
are objecting to basing claims simply on an alleged natural 
tendency of persons to act in certain ways. They deny that such 
behavioral tendencies are "natural" and therefore inevitable or 
unalterable, much less good. If natural law is based on how 
human beings "naturally" or normally act, then it is based on a 
fallacy, for human nature, they argue, is as much a product of 
social attitudes and practices as it is of any "innate" human 
nature. This response to natural law reasoning is based on a 
misunderstanding of natural law reasoning. 
The concept of "human nature" that is the basis of natural law 
is not limited to how persons "naturally," normally, or 
instinctively behave. Natural tendencies play only a very small 
role in such reasoning, though passages from writings on 
natural law sometimes suggest otherwise. Indeed, John Locke 
explicitly denied that natural inclinations were the same as 
natural laws. He rejected the view of those who "seek the 
principles of moral action and a rule to live by in men's 
appetites and natural instincts rather than in the binding force 
of a law, just as if that was morally best which most people 
desired."16 
15. In STRUCTURE OF LIBERTI, supra note *• I identifY several of the relevant 
characteristics and organize them into three categories of social problems: problems of 
knowledge, of interest, and of power. These problems, I argue, must be addressed by 
recognizing certain rights associated with the liberal conception of justice and certain 
principles of legality associated with the rule of law. A summary of a portion of this 
analysis appears in Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of 
Contract, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y62 (1992). 
16. jOHN LOCKE, EssAYS ON TilE LAW OF NATURE 213 (V·l. von Leyden ed., 1954) (1660). 
Although Grotius thought, as did Aquinas and unlike Locke, that human inclinations 
tended to the good, like Locke he too thought that 
(t]he law of nature has its beginnings in instinctive nature, but it is certainly not 
a mere cloak of rectitude over our instincts. Rather, reason is our highest 
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Though classical natural law reasoning is not based on the 
natural instincts of people, to the extent such instincts exist and 
cannot be changed, whether or not such instincts are the 
product of social construction, they may very well influence what 
human laws can and cannot accomplish. For example, if 
humans instinctively do crave survival, a legal system that 
required tremendous personal sacrifice under ordinary 
circumstances is likely to be resisted by many. Or because 
human beings normally try to overcome obstacles put in the way 
of their chosen projects, the prohibition of certain pleasurable 
activities is likely to lead to an illegal or black market to supply 
these activities, and this illegal market, in tum, will likely lead to 
corruption of law enforcement.· Any legal system that ignored 
these likely human reactions to certain laws will reap 
unfortunate consequences. 
The nature of human beings and the world in which they live 
from which "principles of society" are derived goes far beyond 
whatever natural instincts people may have. In addition to their 
psychological makeup, this nature includes the physical needs 
and abilities of human beings and the physical properties of the 
physical world in which humans must live. True, the natural law 
mode of analysis does require us to generalize about these 
features of social life-to abstract from the particulars. And 
though this process is very much one of "construction," it is no 
more or less so than any other theoretical effort. All theories are 
constructed, if by constructed it is meant that they are the 
fallible product of human thought and are not somehow "out 
there" written in the stars.17 
None of this is simple or easy. To the contrary, natural law 
reasoning is highly contestable because it depends on what we 
think are the "facts of human life," both the makeup of human 
beings and the world in which they live, and what 
generalizations we choose to make from these facts. Having 
made these factual generalizations (X), it then depends upon a 
claim that given X, if you want to accomplish Y, then you must 
characteristic good, and so the law of nature must in some way reflect our 
rational nature .... The law of nature is, then, the law of our nature, and thus 
of rational nature: it is not merely the transformation of instincts into laws. 
BUCKLE, supra note 7, at 25. 
17. If by "constructed" it is meant consciously devised as a whole, then this is rarely true 
of human theories. Most theories evolve with only incremental refinements contributed by 
individual theorists. SeeTOULMIN, supra note 12. 
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do Z Each step of this analysis is subject to error and dispute. 
But it is the nature of human life that we must act (this is one of 
those pesky generalizations), and, given this imperative, we must 
decide how to act, and we ought to act as best we can. Adopting 
a natural-law mode of reasoning does not guarantee that we will 
act wisely, but it does, I think, point in the direction of wisdom. 
It tells us what we should be looking for. As important, a proper 
theory of natural law explains what we usually do look for and 
why. 
Though I have drawn a· parallel between natUral laws in 
engineering and those which concern the governance of society, 
this version of natural law does not succumb to H.L.A. Hart's 
criticism that some natural-law proponents confuse two different 
uses of the term law: so-called natural laws that can be "broken" 
by human beings and physical laws that cannot. According to 
Hart, though human beings can disobey so-called natural laws, 
[i]f the stars behave in ways contrary to the scientific laws 
which purport to describe their regular movements, these are 
not broken but they lose their title to be called 'laws' and 
must be reformulated .... So, on this view, belief in Natural 
Law is reducible to a very simple fallacy: a failure to perceive 
the very different senses which those law-impregnated words 
can bear.18 
In the conception of natural law I have sketched here, 
"scientific" laws influence the formation of "natural-law" 
principles of society in the same way they bear on the normative 
principles of agriculture, architecture, and engineering. Given 
facts about human nature and the nature of the world 
(including, but not limited to, such "scientific" laws as the law of 
gravity), ifyou want to accomplish certain ends, then you should 
do X While a human actor cannot "break" the law of gravity or 
the natural law principles that apply to human social interaction 
in the sense of repealing them, one pays a price for violating 
them none-the-less. 
Unsurprisingly then, while Hart rejects the identification of 
natural law with physical laws, he endorses a conception of 
natural law whose analytic structure is much the same as the 
natural-law theories I have cited above: 
18. HART, supra note 13, at 183. 
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Reflection on some very obvious generalizations, indeed 
truisms, concerning human nature and the world in which 
men live, show that as long as these hold good, there are 
certain rules of conduct which any social organization must 
contain if it is to be viable. . . . Such universally recognized 
principles of conduct which have a basis in elementary truths 
concerning human beings, their natural environment, and 
aims, may be considered the minimum content of Natural Law, 
in contrast with the more grandiose and more challengeable 




Hart takes as "given" five contingent facts about "human 
nature and the world in which men live"20: (a) human 
vulnerability; (b) approximate equality; (c) limited altruism; (d) 
limited resources; and (e) limited understanding and strength 
of will.21 He then assumes, on the basis of observation, the 
additional contingent fact that most people desire to survive: 
"survival has ... a special status in relation to human conduct 
and in our thought about it, which parallels the prominence 
and the necessity ascribed to it in the orthodox formulations of 
Natural Law."22 
Hart concludes that, given these five factual conditions, if 
persons desire to survive, then their legal systems ought to have 
such features as rules that "restrict the use of violence in killing 
or inflicting bodily harm";2., "a system of mutual forbearance and 
compromise";24 "s~me minimal form of the institution of 
property (though not necessarily individual property), and the 
distinctive kind of rule which requires respect for it";25 rules that 
"enable individuals to create obligations and to vary their 
incidence";26 and the imposition of sanctions by an "organization 
for the coercion of those who would ... try to obtain the 
advantages of the system without submitting to its obligations."27 
A natural law method of analysis need not be confined to the 
facts Hart takes as given, nor limited to the objective of survival. 
19. Id. at 188-S9. 
20. Id. at 188. 
21. Id. at 19().193. 
22. Id. at 188. 
23. HART, supra note 13, at 190. 
24. Id. at 191. 
25. Id. at 192. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 193. 
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Nevertheless, for a natural-law method of analysis to yield 
answers to the question of how human beings are to survive, and 
pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in society 
with others, it must be based on some such generalized features 
of human beings and the world that are common to all persons 
who are interacting with one another. With all this in mind, 
what then is the difference between natural law and natural 
rights? 
II. NATURAL LAW ETHICS VERSUS NATURAL RIGHTS 
As I have sketched it here, natural law describes a method of 
analysis of the following type: "Given that the nature of human 
beings and the world in which they live is X, if we want to 
achieve Y, then we ought to do Z. "The subject of any particular 
natural law analysis fills in the "if." When the subject is 
agriculture, the "if' might be "if we want to raise crops so that 
human beings may eat." When the subject is engineering the "if' 
might be "if we want to build a bridge so that human beings may 
cross a river." By the same token, the study of ethics may be 
conceived as an inquiry into the question of "given the nature of 
human beings and the world in which they live (X), if a person 
wants to live a good life (Y), then he or she ought to do Z." 
Whether we attempt to feed ourselves, build bridges, or live a 
good life is a matter of choice (though human nature may impel 
a certain choice2H). How we go about making our attempts and 
whether they succeed or fail will be constrained by natural law. 
Thus, applying a natural-law method of analysis to the ethical 
question of how people ought to live their lives would begin with 
an inquiry into the nature of a "good life," resting this 
judgment, at least in part, on human nature. Then, given a 
conception of the good life, a "natural-law ethics" could 
potentially address nearly every choice a person confronts. 
Should I go to school? Which one? What should I study? Should 
I use drugs? With whom should I have sex? Each one of these 
28. Aristotelians and Thomists contend that it is part of man's nature to pursue the 
good, and I take no stance on this issue. See e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIGA 
pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2, reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 2228 (Robert 
Hutchins ed., Encyclopa:dia Britannica 1952) ("(I]n man there is an inclination to good 
in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances; that is, every 
substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature."). 
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questions can potentially be addressed by the natural-law 
method of "given-if-then" analysis. 
Does a natural-law approach to ethics also entail that human 
law coercively mandate every ethical or moral action 
recommended by a natural-law analysis and punish every 
immoral or unethical act? Do the constraints on action 
recommended by a natural-law ethics imply coercively imposed 
legal constraints on virtue and vice? Because some think the 
answers to these questions are yes, they associate a commitment 
to natural-law reasoning about virtue and vice with authoritarian 
political theory. Yet even the father of modem natural law 
analysis, Thomas Aquinas, did not hold to so conservative a view. 
In answer to the question, "Whether human law prescribes acts 
of all the virtues," he wrote: 
[H]uman law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of 
every virtue, but only in regard to those that can be ordered 
to the common good, either immediately, as when certain 
things are done directly for the common good, or mediately, 
as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to 
good order, by which the citizens are directed in the 
upholding of the common good of justice and peace.29 
And, after asking "whether it pertains to human law to repress 
all vices," he answered: 
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the 
majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human 
laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, 
but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for 
the majority to abstain, and chiefly those that are to the hurt 
of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be 
maintained; thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the 
like.30 
In this manner, Aquinas anticipated a distinction that later 
came to be made by classical liberal political theorists. While a 
natural-law analysis could be applied to a variety of questions, 
including the question of how human beings ought to act (for 
example, vice and virtue), the question of how society ought to be 
structured is a separate and quite distinct inquiry. Given the 
various problems that arise when humans live and act in society 
29. !d. at 232B (emphasis added). 
30. !d. at 232A (emphasis added). 
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with others, the classical liberal answer to the latter question31 
was that each person needed a "space" over which he or she has 
sole jurisdiction or liberty to act and within which no one else 
may rightfully interfere. The concepts defining this "liberty" or 
moral space came to be known as natural rights. 
Unlike a natural law approach to ethics, then, natural rights 
do not proscribe how rights-holders ought to act towards others. 
Rather they describe how others ought to act towards rights-
holders. As explained by seventeenth-century natural-rights 
theorist Dudley Digges: 
If we looke back to the law of Nature, we shall finde that the 
people would have had a clearer and most distinct notion of 
it, if common use of calling it Law had not helped to 
confound their understanding, when it ought to have been 
named the Right of nature; for Right and Law differ as much 
as Liberty and Bonds: Jus, or right not laying any obligation, 
but signifying, we may equally choose to doe or not to doe 
without fault, whereas Lex or law determines us either to a 
particular performance by way of command, or a particular 
abstinence by way of prohibition; and therefore jus naturae, 
all the right of nature, which now we can innocently make 
use of, is that freedome, not which any law gives us, but which 
no law takes away, and !awes are the several! restraints and 
limitations of native liberty.32 
Thus it is a mistake, and an all-too-common one, to equate 
natural law with natural rights. Natural law is a broader term 
referring to the given-if:.then method of evaluating choices based 
on the "given" of human nature and the nature of the world. A 
natural-law approach to ethics uses a given-if-then analysis to 
evaluate the propriety of any human action. In contrast, a 
natural-rights analysis uses a natural law given-if-then 
methodology to identify the liberty or space within which persons 
ought to be free to make their own choices. It seeks to 
determine the appropriate social structure within which people 
ought to be free to do as they please. 
According to this distinction, when discussing moral virtues 
and vices-or the problem of distinguishing good from bad 
behavior-the imperative for which is supposedly based on 
human nature, natural-law ethics is the appropriate term 
31. I am not suggesting that this was Aquinas's answer. 
32. DUDLEY DIGGES, THE UNIAWFULNESSE OF SUBJECTS, TAKING UP ARMES AGAINSf THEIR 
SOVERAIGNE sig. B3v. (1644), quoted in TUCK, supra note 11, at 102..03. 
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(though such principles are sometimes referred to simply as 
natural law). When discussing the contours of the moral 
jurisdiction defined by principles of justice-or the problem of 
distinguishing right from wrong behavior-which is supposedly 
based on the nature of human beings and the world in which 
they live, the appropriate term would be natural rights. Whereas 
natural law ethics provides guidance for our actions, natural 
rights define a moral space or liberty-as opposed to license-in 
which we may act free from the interference of other persons. 
In short, natural-law ethics instructs us on how to exercise the liberty 
that is defined and protected by natural rights. Although principles of 
natural-law ethics can be used to guide one's conduct, they 
should not be enforced coercively by human law if doing so 
would violate the moral space or liberty defined by natural 
rights. Thus, one can reject a natural-law approach to 
proscribing the ethics or propriety of human conduct, and still 
accept the usefulness of a natural-rights approach to specify the 
appropriate principles of justice that comprise a social structure 
within which people can pursue happiness, peace, and 
prosperity. 
Justice is a concept-a concept that is used to evaluate the 
propriety of using force. We resort to justice to tell us how 
persons ought to act, not generally as a natural-law ethics may 
do, but specifically when they seek to use force against others. 
The classical liberal approach defines justice in terms of 
particular natural rights, for example, the rights of several 
property, freedom of contract, self-defense, and restitution, for 
various reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article.33 This 
classical liberal conception of justice (and the rule of law) is 
then used to evaluate critically and to correct human laws that 
are enforced coercively. 
Defining justice in terms of rights, especially natural rights, 
will invite confusion, however, unless we are clearer about what 
it means to call something a right. A nice description is provided 
by Allen Buchanan: 
[A]ssertions of rights are essentially conclusory and hence 
argumentative. An assertion of right is a conclusion about what 
the moral priorities are. At the same time, because it is a 
33. I will present these reasons in STRUCTURE OF LlBERlY, supra note *· I provide a brief 
and quite incomplete summary in Barnett, supra note 15. 
670 Haroard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 20 
conclusion, it is an admission that it is appropriate to demand 
support for this conclusion, reasons why such priority ought 
to be recognized. And it is vital to recognize that there is a 
plurality of different kinds of considerations that can count as 
moral reasons to support a conclusion of this sort and that 
the conclusion that an assertion of a right expresses will 
usually be an all-things-considered jud~ent, the result of a 
balancing of conflicting considerations: 
Thus, to call something a natural right is to assert one's 
conclusion; it is no substitute for presenting the reasons why this 
conclusion is justified. What makes natural rights natural is the 
type of given-if-then reasons that are offered in support of its 
conclusions, based as they are on the "givens" of human nature 
and the nature of the world in which humans live. What makes 
such concepts rights is the "natural necessity,"85 to use H.L.A. 
Hart's felicitous term, of adhering to them if we are to solve 
certain pervasive social problems that must be solved somehow if 
persons are to achieve their objectives. 
Why the conclusions reached by a natural-rights analysis are 
properly called rights is more easily grasped if we distinguish 
between "background" and "legal" rights. Background rights are 
those claims a person has to legal enforcement that are justified, 
on balance, by the full constellation of relevant reasons, whether 
or not they are actually recognized and enforced by a legal 
system. Legal rights, by contrast, are those claims that some actual 
legal system will recognize as valid.86 The legal rights that a 
34. ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALI1Y OF POUTIC'.AL DIVORCE FROM FORT 
SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 151 (1991). 
35. HART, supra note 13, at 195 (emphasis removed from word "natural"). Hart uses this 
term while discussing the imperative to have coercive sanctions in a legal system, as well as 
rules protecting bodily integrity, property, and contractual commitments: 
/d. 
We can say, given the setting of natural facts and aims, which make sanctions 
both possible and necessary in a municipal system, that this is a natural 
necessity; and some such phrase is needed also to convey the status of the 
minimum forms of protection for persons, property, and promises which are 
similarly indispensable features of municipal law. . . . [A] place must be 
reserved, besides definitions and ordinary statements o.f fact, for a third 
category of statements: those the truth of which is contingent on human beings 
and the world they live in retaining the salient characteristics which they have. 
36. I have loosely adopted this from Ronald Dworkin's distinction between "background" 
and "institutional" rights: "Any adequate [political] theory wiii distinguish ••• between 
background rights, which are rights that provide a justification for political decisions by 
society in the abstract, and institutional rights, that provide a justification for a decision by 
some particular and specified political institution." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 93 (1977). Unfortunately, this helpful distinction has disappeared from 
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particular legal system recognizes as valid may or may not 
conform to the background rights specified by the liberal 
conception of justice. Natural-rights reasoning is a method of 
identifying background rights against which the legal rights of 
any particular legal system can be assessed. If done properly, 
then, a natural-rights analysis provides reasons why legal rights 
ought to correspond as closely as possible with natural rights. As 
H. L.A. Hart put it: 
In considering the simple truisms which we set forth here, 
and their connexion with law and morals, it is important to 
observe that in each case the facts mentioned afford a reason 
why, given survival as an aim, law and morals should include a 
specific content. The general form of the argument is simply 
that without such a content laws and morals could not 
fonvard the minimum purpose of survival which men have in 
. . 'th h th 37 assoctatmg WI eac o er. 
In my view, a natural-rights analysis should also take as its 
objective, not only the "purpose of survival which man have in 
associating with each other," but also the pursuit of happiness, 
peace, and prosperity. As I explain elsewhere,ss to structure 
society so as to pursue these ends, human beings must somehow 
come to grips with the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power. Doing so will require adherence to the rights and 
procedures that define the liberal conception of justice and the 
rule of law. According to this natural-law argument, given the 
pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power 
confronting every human society, ifhuman beings are to survive 
and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in 
society with others, then their laws must not violate certain 
background natural rights or the rule oflaw. 
III. NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATORINESS OF HUMAN LAWS 
Is this given-if-then conception of natural rights robust 
enough to create a moral obligation that they be respected? Are 
those persons who do not accept the "if' in this given-if-then 
analysis morally bound to adhere to natural rights? Michael 
Dworkin's later writings, and it is nowhere to be found in RONALD DWORKIN, lAw's EMPIRE 
(1986). 
37. HART, supra note 13, at 189. 
38. See Barnett, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTI, supra note*· 
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Zuckert pointedly identifies this difficulty for Hugo Grotius's 
given-if-then conception of natural law: 
Grotius appears able, at best, to generate a hypothetical 
obligation: to live according to one's nature, one ought to 
obey the natural law. But where is the obligation to live 
according to nature? .... As Grotius concedes in a key place, 
perhaps the best one can really say is that it is "wise" to live 
according to the promptings of nature; he cannot establish 
the obligatoriness of natural law.39 
This difficulty may be recast as follows: in what sense are 
natural rights, conceived in the way I do here, obligatory 
requirements of justice as opposed to mere prudential guides to 
conduct? Are persons obligated to respect them, particularly, if 
they reject the purposes they serve? 
For reasons I shall explain in this section, I think this response 
overstates the distinction between justice and prudence. In this 
matter I agree with Phillipa Foote, who wrote: "That moral 
judgments cannot be hypothetical imperatives has come to seem 
an unquestionable truth. It will be argued here that it is not. "40 
The distinction between a hypothetical imperative and a 
categorical imperative was made by Immanuel Kant: 
All imperatives command either hypotheticaUy or categorically. 
Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be 
practically necessary as a means to the attainment of 
something else that one wills (or that one may will). A 
categorical imperative would be one which represented an 
action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation 
to a further end. 41 
Categorical imperatives "tell us what we have to do whatever 
our interests or desires, and by their inescapability they are 
distinguished from hypothetical imperatives."42 
Foote questions whether categorical imperatives are really any 
more "imperative" than hypothetical ones. A moral man "has 
moral ends and cannot be indifferent to matters such as 
39. MICHAELZUCKERT, NATURALRIGHTSANDTHENEWREPUBLIC'.ANISM 191 (1994). 
40. Phillipa Foote, MllTality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL. REV. 305, 305 
(1972). 
41. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 82 (H. J. Paton 
trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). The meaning of this passage may be clarified by 
substituting the term "desire" for the word "will" as some translations do. 
42. Foote, supra note 40, at 308. 
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suffering and injustice."43 He does not have these ends because 
they are dictated by categorical imperatives but because he is 
moral and cares about morality, including the morality dictated 
by categorical imperatives. Foote argues that, despite the efforts 
of philosophers to show otherwise, the mere existence of a 
categorical imperative does not provide a reason for an amoral 
person to adopt a moral demand. 
If he is an amoral man, he may deny that he has any reason to 
trouble his head over this or any other moral demand. Of 
course, he may be mistaken, and his life as well as others' lives 
may be most sadly spoiled by his selfishness. But this is not 
what is urged by those who think they can close the matter by 
an emphatic use of "ought." My argument is that they are 
relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral "ought" a 
• ~ 44 
magiC 1.0rce. 
In short, only if one cares about morality will one care about a 
categorical imperative. 
I shall not attempt to summarize further Professor Foote's 
argument here, nor wager an opinion on whether hypothetical 
imperatives are just as "moral" as categorical ones. Instead, I will 
supplement her argument with several reasons why, regardless 
of whether one accepts her conclusion, the hypothetical 
imperatives provided by the sort of natural-rights analysis I am 
describing were of moral significance. For the real issue may be 
not so much whether background natural rights are morally 
obligatory, but the moral obligatoriness of human laws that 
infringe upon them. 
The term "law" can be used descriptively or normatively. 
Descriptively, it can refer to commands by a recognized law-
maker which, if disobeyed, will result in the imposition of a legal 
sanction, whether or not such commands are just. Even the 
natural-law theorist Thomas Aquinas was quite capable of 
distinguishing, as a descriptive matter, between those human 
laws that were just and those that were unjust, when he declared 
that "[l]aws framed by man are either just or unjust."45 Whether 
just or unjust, Aquinas described both as "laws." 
Rather, for Aquinas and other natural law thinkers, the issue 
of lawfulness is not purely descriptive or "value-neutral" as it is 
43. Id. at 315 
44. Id. 
45. AQUINAS, supra note 28, at 233A. 
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for modem legal positivists,46 but normative. Only just laws "have 
the power of binding in conscience."47 It is this issue of "binding 
in conscience" that informs his endorsement of Augustine's 
statement that "that which is not just seems to be no law at all; 
therefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its jusqce. "4H 
By "force" he meant moral force of a law to bind in conscience. 
As john Locke wrote, "we should not obey a kingjust out of fear, 
because, being more powerful, he can constrain (this in fact 
would be to establish firmly the authority of tyrants, robbers, and 
pirates), but for conscience' sake."49 Locke concluded from this 
that, "[h]ence the binding force of civil law is dependent on 
natural law; and we are not so much coerced into rendering 
obedience to the magistrate by the power of the civil law as 
bound to obedience by natural right."50 Unless they adhere to 
natural law, "the rulers can perhaps by force and with the aid of 
arms compel the multitude to obedience, but put them under an 
obligation they cannot."51 
Unlike some philosophers, persons who make laws are not 
content to employ a merely descriptive "value-free" conception 
of law. When they use the term law to describe their commands 
they typically claim that others do have a moral duty to obey 
them. It is legitimate therefore to assess the validity of their 
claim. Do their commands really create a duty of obedience? 
H.L.A. Hart correctly acknowledged that the challenge for legal 
positivism is to explain how a legal command is different than a 
command of a gunman-a "gunman situation writ large."52 To 
this he responded by invoking (albeit without acknowledgment) 
Locke's distinction between being obliged to obey a command in 
the sense that one will be coerced into obedience, and having an 
obligation.53 While one was obliged----or to use Locke's word, 
46. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORI1Y OF LAW 39-40 (1979) ("A jurisprudential 
theory is acceptable only if its tests for identifying the content of the law and 
determining its existence depend exclusively on facts of human behavior capable of 
being described in value-neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument.") 
(emphasis added). 
47. /d. 
48. /d. at 227 (emphasis added). 
49. LoCKE, supra note 16, at 189. 
50. /d. 
51. /d. at 119 (emphasis added). 
52. HART, supra note 13, at 7. 
53. See HART, supra note 13, at 80: "There is a difference ••• between the assertion that 
someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an obligation to do it." 
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"compelled"-to obey the gunman, one had no obligation to do 
so. But whence comes an obligation to obey the law? 
Hart departed from nineteenth-century legal-positivist John 
Austin (as well as from Oliver Wendell Holmes54) by 
acknowledging that legal obligation is typically perceived by 
individuals, not merely as a command from a superior to a 
subject or as a way to predict the imposition of a legal sanction, 
but also as a reason for personal conduct. This "internal" point of 
view cannot be explained entirely by the physical coercion 
attached to noncompliance."5 For Hart, the perception of 
obligation was based either on the widespread acceptance of 
"primary rules" regulating individual conduct56 or on the 
widespread acceptance of "secondary rules" that regulate the 
making of primary rules.57 And what, according to Hart, 
accounted for such popular acceptance of primary or secondary 
rules? 
Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations 
when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the 
social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or 
threaten to deviate is great. 
... The rules supported by this serious social pressure are 
thought important because they are believed to be necessary 
to the maintenance of social life or some highly prized 
feature of it. 58 
54. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 
(1897) (emphasis added): 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables 
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
55. See HART, supra note 13, at 85-SS. As he summarized this point, for the majority of 
society, "the violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction 
will follow but a reason for hostility." I d. at 88. 
56. Id. at 91. For Hart's description of these "primary rules," see id. at 89-91. Hart's 
description sounds a lot like the liberal conception of justice I defend elsewhere (see, e.g., 
Barnett, supra, note 15): "If a society is to live by such primary rules alone, there are certain 
conditions which, granted a few of the most obvious truisms about human nature and the 
world we live in, must clearly be satisfied. The first of these conditions is that the rules must 
contain in some form restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and deception to which 
human beings are tempted but which they must, in general, repress, if they are to coexist in 
close proximity to each other." Id. at 89. 
57. /d. at 91. For Hart's description of these "secondary rules," see id. at 91-95. 
58. /d. at 8485. 
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Legal obligation in Hart's scheme, then, is largely, if not 
entirely, a matter of perception. Legal rules create obligations of 
obedience when they are "thought important because they are 
believed to be necessary."59 
But at most Hart's account explains the general perception in a 
given society of an obligation to obey the law, not whether there 
truly is such an obligation. When a law-making authority claims 
that we are obligated (not merely obliged or compelled) to obey 
its commands, we are entitled to ask whether this claim is 
warranted. When a normative conception of law entailing a 
moral obligation to obey is invoked, whatever quality a law must 
have to make binding in conscience, we are entitled to demand 
that this quality goes in before the name "law" goes on. 
In sum, to determine whether legal rules are really obligatory 
we must ask whether they are in fact, as Hart put it, "necessary to 
the maintenance of social life." And this is exactly what a 
natural-rights inquiry attempts to do. If adherence to natural-
rights is indeed essential for the maintenance of social life, as 
natural rights theorists maintain, then laws are obligatory only if 
they are consistent with natural rights. By this account, 
commands may be "law" in the descriptive sense that they are 
issued by a recognized law-maker, but they are only law, in the 
normative sense of a command that binds in conscience on the 
citizenry, if such commands do not violate the background 
rights of persons. Thus, for human laws to be obligatory, they 
should not violate natural rights.60 For human beings in society 
with others, to be able to pursue happiness, peace, and 
prosperity, certain background natural rights must be 
recognized as enforceable legal rights.61 
This account of the obligation to obey the law suggests yet 
another reason why human law or legal rights should respect 
certain natural rights. At the same time law makers claim that 
subjects of their laws have a moral duty of obedience, they also 
invariably claim that their laws advance the general welfare or 
59. /d. at 85 (emphasis added). 
60. Although it may be necessary that laws not violate rights for them to be obligatory, 
this may not be sufficient. Along with requirements of justice, requirements of legality 
specified by the rule oflaw must also be respected. 
61. Once again, I discuss the particular rights to which I think adherence is necessary, 
and the reasons why this is so, in my forthcoming book, supra note *· 
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the common good. Indeed, if pressed, many would advance the 
latter claim in defense of the former, that is, people have a duty 
to obey the laws because adherence to the laws does advance the 
general welfare. Yet if the analysis presented in favor of certain 
rights as natural is correct, then laws that violate these rights do 
not advance the general welfare or common good. Indeed, they 
harm it. Thus human laws that violate natural rights are not 
obligatory, and only those human laws that respect natural 
rights can be obligatory. 
Finally, this previous observation suggests yet another basis for 
legal rights to adhere to natural rights. We have all heard that 
the legitimacy of law making is grounded on the "consent of the 
governed" to the law-making regime. Yet the analysis just 
presented suggests that the obligation of law makers to respect 
natural rights rests, at least in part, on the "consent of the 
governors" to respect these rights. For do not law makers 
explicitly or implicitly claim that their laws promote the 
common good and are not unjust? By doing so, are they not 
consenting to adhere to any principles of justice that, if violated, 
would thwart the common good? For example, the preface to 
the United States Constitution explicitly claims that its purpose 
was to "establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, ... promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."62 Do not 
lawmakers in the United States who take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution explicitly obligate themselves to pass laws that 
actually do establish justice, do ensure peace, do promote the 
general welfare, and do secure liberty? Therefore, if the 
argument in favor of certain natural rights holds, then these 
background rights must be respected by lawmakers in devising 
legal rights if for no other reason than because they have 
promised or consented to do so. 
For all these reasons, even if natural rights generated only a 
"prudential" or "hypothetical" obligation, this would be very 
significant. For the hypothetical obligation at issue is: if we want 
a society in which persons can survive and pursue happiness, peace, and 
prosperity, then we should respect the liberal conception of 
justice (as defined by natural rights) and the rule of law. Who 
62. U.S. CONST. preamble. 
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among us would not accept this as their political goal? What 
lawmaker would deny that he or she desires this objective? 
Responding to those who would consider as dangerous and 
subversive a view of justice that depends on the contingent fact 
that people happen to care about certain shared objectives, 
Phillipa Foote observed: 
But it is interesting that the people of Leningrad were not 
similarly struck by the thought that only the contingent fact 
that other citizens shared their loyalty and devotion to the 
city stood between them and the Germans during the terrible 
years of the siege. Perhaps we should be less troubled than we 
are by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps we 
should even have less reason to fear it if people thought of 
themselves as volunteers banded together to fight for liberty 
and justice and against inhumanity and oppression. 6., 
Of course, in suggesting that legal rights should correspond 
with background rights, I claim neither that we can use natural 
rights to derive legal rights, nor that we can always know what a 
particular person's background rights are independent of the 
processes that produce legal rights. Background natural rights 
are highly abstract, and many different sets of rules or laws may 
be consistent with them. Further, theorists speculating about 
background rights usually, if not always, take the legal rights 
with which they are familiar as starting points. A legal system 
operating according to certain procedures associated with the 
rule of law may be needed to generate a set of legal rights that 
can serve as a necessary starting point of any theory of 
background rights. And, if these rule of law procedures are 
sound, then the starting points they provide may not be entirely 
arbitrary. In determining the content of background rights, 
legal rights generated by a sound legal process may even be 
entitled to presumptive legitimacy. 
Yet despite these caveats, a natural rights analysis attempts to 
provide knowledge of certain "principles of society" that must be 
respected if persons are to pursue happiness, peace, and 
prosperity while living in society with others. Though they may 
often be more controversial than principles of engineering, 
architecture, and agriculture, these principles have the same 
status. 
63. Foote, supra note 40, at 315-16. 
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IV. NATURAL RIGHTS AND UTILITY 
Is a natural rights analysis utilitarian? Although I do not have a 
strong view on this question, for what it is worth, my answer 
depends on how the term "utilitarian" is used. If utilitarian is 
viewed as a consequentialist approach that evaluates practices by 
their consequences, then the conception of natural rights 
sketched here appears to be consequentialist, though only 
indirectly.64 Some rights are thought to be natural because 
adherence to them is necessary to solve serious social problems. 
For this reason, these rights (not an assessment of utility) are 
then used to evaluate the justice of human laws. 
I must hasten to add, however, that though a given-if-then 
argument provides reasons to favor natural rights, these reasons 
may well be reinforced and bolstered by other equally valid 
"nonconsequentialist" types of analysis.65 Moreover, the 
argument presented here assumes that the goal of enabling 
persons to survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity, 
while living in society with others, is worthwhile. If this goal 
needs to be defended, then it must be on some other grounds-
and such grounds need not be consequentialist. 
If utilitarianism is viewed as a general theory of ethics or 
morality, however, then the natural-rights approach presented 
here, though consequentialist, is not utilitarian. The approach 
presented here does not provide a theory of how persons ought 
to pursue the good life, the traditional province of ethics. Many 
but not all natural rights theorists also take a natural-law 
approach to this question, but historically a natural-law 
approach to ethics has been more teleological-that is, based on 
the natural end or good for human beings66-than utilitarian. 
64. See Lany Alexander, Pursuing the Good, Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 317 (1985) ("An 
indirect consequentialist is one who, whatever his theory of the Good, believes the Good is 
not best attained by conscious attempts to achieve it each time we act. ");John Gray, Indirect 
Utility and Fundamental Rights, 1 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y73 (1984). 
65. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs, The Compatibility of Moral 
Rights and ConsequentialistAnalyses,12 HARV.j. L & PUB. POL'Y610, 611-35 (1989). 
66. See, e.g., HART, supra note 13, at 185 (describing the association of natural-law thinking 
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Perhaps most importantly, if utilitarianism is taken as a method 
of decisionmaking in which the effects of various policies are 
assessed by determining their effects on the sum of all 
individual's subjective preferences, then the view of natural 
rights described here is decidedly not utilitarian. For the 
indirect consequentialist analysis presented here suggests that 
respecting natural rights, not the calculation and aggregation of 
subjective preferences, promotes the common good. And the 
common good is viewed, not as a sum ofpreference'satisfaction, 
but as the ability of each person to pursue happiness, peace, and 
prosperity while in acting in close proximity to others. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By running natural law together with natural rights, law 
professors typically miss the subtleties of natural law and natural 
rights arguments. How then, in a nutshell, should law professors 
distinguish between natural law and natural rights? We can sum 
up the preceding analysis as follows. 
Natural law refers to the given-if-then method of analysis where 
the "given" is the nature of human beings and the world in 
which they live. This method can be applied to a number of 
distinct problems, the "if." When discussing moral virtues and 
vices, or the problem of distinguishing good from bad behavior, 
the imperative for which is supposedly based on human nature, 
natural-law ethics is the appropriate term (though such 
principles are sometimes referred to simply as natural law). 
When discussing the contours of the moral jurisdiction defined 
by principles of justice, or the problem of distinguishing right 
from wrong behavior, which is supposedly based on the nature of 
human beings and the world in which they live, the appropriate 
term would be natural rights. 
In short, natural-law ethics instructs us on how to exercise the liberty 
that is defined and protected by natural rights. Whereas natural-law 
ethics provides guidance for our actions, natural rights define a 
moral space or liberty, as opposed to license,67 in which we may 
act free from the interference of other persons. Although 
principles of natural-law ethics can be used to guide individual 
67. See jOHN LoCKE, TWO 'TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 311 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Mentor rev. ed. 1965) (1690) ("[T]hough this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of 
License."). 
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conduct, they should not be enforced coercively by human law if 
doing so would violate the moral space or liberty defined by 
natural rights. And human laws that violate natural rights do not 
bind the citizenry in conscience. 
